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Theories of rational addiction posit that certain habit-forming goods—characterized by an 
increasing marginal utility of consumption—generate predictable dynamic patterns of 
consumer behavior.  It has been suggested that attendance at sporting events represents an 
example of such a good, as evidenced by the pricing strategies of commercial sports interests.  
In this essay, we provide new evidence in support of rational addiction for the case of Major 
League Baseball, but fail to find such support in data from the Korean Professional Baseball 
League.  We then review the scientific literature on sports fans from the perspective of 
human behavioral ecology and propose a theory of endogenous habit formation among sports 
fans that could explain our findings.   
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Men's natures are alike; it is their habits that separate them. 
        -Confucius 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
Static microeconomic theory predicts that profit-maximizing monopolists will price in the 
elastic range of demand.  The recurrent finding that many (perhaps most) professional sports 
teams—local monopolists all—choose ticket prices in the inelastic range has therefore been a 
persistent puzzle.
1   
One commonly offered explanation  for  this finding is that  the  ticket  price does not 
capture the  full cost of attending a game ( Fort 2003, Krautmann and Berri 2006).   In this 
view, t he ticket-price elasticity of attendance should be low  because teams  that set prices 
higher would suffer revenue losses from parking, concessions, and merchandise sales.  In 
other words, the standard theoretical prediction (that monopolists set price in the elastic 
range) should properly be tested with respect to total cost of attendance rather than ticket 
price alone.  However, we provide a n indirect test of this hypothesis using fan cost data 
from Major League Baseball (MLB) in Section 3 below, and nevertheless find support for 
inelastic pricing.   
An alternative explanation for the inelastic demand phenomenon is the possibility that 
inelastic  pricing might serve to maximize profits in a dynamic framework in which 
attendance meets the economic definition of a habit-forming good.  Ahn and Lee (2003) 
show in a simple two-period model that inelastic pricing is consistent with profit-maximizing 
behavior if attendance is habit-forming and fans’ intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) 
                                                               
1 For reviews of the literature on the demand for attendance at sporting events, see Fort (2004) and Krautmann 
and Hadley (2005).   3 
is small.   The intuition behind this finding is as follows: just as teams would be well-served 
to consider non-ticket (but attendance-dependent) revenue in setting price, they would also do 
well to consider the dynamic effects of ticket price on future attendance.    In other words, 
even if setting a lower price decreases current revenue, it is possible that this loss might be 
more than offset by increased revenue in the future.    From the perspective of the fan, if 
future (i.e., next season) attendance is a poor substitute for current attendance (IES is small) 
and the marginal utility of future attendance is an increasing function of current  attendance 
(attendance is h abit-forming), then increases in current ticket prices are likely to have a 
negative affect on both current and future attendance.  These are precisely the conditions 
under which a forward-looking team owner would set ticket prices below the level predicted 
by static microeconomic theory.   
One shortcoming common to most economic theories of habit formation (also known as 
“rational addiction”) is a lack of endogeneity—that is to say, for the most part theories of 
rational addiction fail to offer ex ante predictions about which goods are likely to be habit-
forming, under what conditions they will be habit  forming, or which consumers might be 
expected to be susceptible to such habits.  We demonstrate the  empirical relevance of such 
questions in Section 3, where we provide estimates of the strength of habit formation among 
baseball fans in the U.S. and Korea, and—after finding important differences between the 
two countries—proceed in Section 4 to propose a theory of endogenous habit formation 
applicable to attendance at sporting events.   
2.  Empirical Model 
We consider a rational  expectations model of  lifetime  consumption that can be used to 
estimate both the IES parameter and the extent to which baseball attendance is habit-forming.   
Our econometric model follows  Dynan  (2000), which departs somewhat  from  the 
specifications of  Becker and Murphy (1988) and Becker, Grossman and Murphy (1994).  4 
Unlike the assumption of perfect foresight on the part of the consumer employed by these 
authors, Dynan’s model allows for future uncertainty.     
Following Dynan, we assume that fans are rational and maximize constant-relative-risk-
aversion (CRRA) utility functions; that is,  a representative sports fan chooses  how many 
games to attend in the current period (




















￿￿ ￿￿ - ¢ S+W ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ - ￿￿ Łł
  (1) 
subject to the intertemporal budget constraint: 
  1 (1). tttttt ArApATTqY - £+--  
where At denotes the value of assets and xt is a vector of observable variables that can shift 
the fan’s intertemporal utility function at time t;  Yt and qt are a composite of consumption 
goods and services other than baseball games and the price of this composite, respectively; 
o t W is the information set available to the sports fan at time t0; pt is the ticket price at time  t; 
and  g  is  the  IES parameter.  Note that in this specification  1 tt ATTATT a - -  can be 
interpreted as the consumption service flow from baseball at time t, the real interest rate r is 
constant over time, and we assume ß = 1/(1+r).   
Under the above assumptions,  Dynan (2000)  shows that for large  T, the first-order 
























￿￿ - ¢ DW= ￿￿ - Łł
,  (2) 
which can be linearized to obtain a regression model: 
  1111 ln()ln()ln() ttttt ATTATTpx agqe ++++ ¢ D=D-D+D+   (3) 5 
where et+1 is  a forecast error with mean zero.  As noted in Ahn and Lee (2003), price 
elasticity is a function of both degree of habit formation (a) and IES (g ): greater  a and/or 
smaller  g  imply more inelastic demand for attendance.   
The estimation of (3)  is not trivial.  Because our attendance data  is comprised of the 
actual number of attendees in a given season, it does not distinguish  between  attendees at 
different classes of seats; in other words, there are likely to be important measurement errors.  
Dynan (2000) shows that this measurement errors problem induces MA(2) in the error terms, 
which implies that the  lagged attendance growth rate  D ln(ATTt) is endogenous.  This will 
affect our estimation strategy, as discussed in Section 3.2, below.   
3.  Data and Empirical Results 
3.1. Data 
We  employ two  separate data sets ( summarized  in Table  1):  one for M ajor  League 
Baseball (MLB) and one for the  Korean Professional  Baseball  League (KPBL).  The MLB 
data consist of a panel covering the period from 1991 through 2000 and includes all teams 
except the Arizona Diamondbacks, Tampa Bay Devil Rays, Montreal Expos, and Toronto 
Blue Jays.    This data set allows us to replicate the results of Ahn and Lee (2003), with the 
important difference being that we adjust for non-ticket fan expenditures.    As noted above, a 
recent series of papers have appeared that attempt to explain inelastic attendance demand by 
recognizing the importance other revenue sources.  Krautmann and Berri (2006) propose 
that lowering prices into the inelastic range allows the team to maximize profits by trading 
off gate revenues for additional concessionary revenue.  By way of testing this hypothesis, 
we substitute a fan cost index (FCI) in place of ticket price.
2  As a proxy for fan income, we 
                                                               
2 FCI is the estimated cost of MLB attendance based on a standardized bundle of tickets and concession goods 
at a given stadium in a given year.  This bundle includes: four average-price tickets, four small soft drinks, two 
small beers, four hot dogs, two game programs, parking, and two adult-size caps.  The FCI and attendance data 
were obtained from Rodney Fort’s Sports Business Data Pages: 6 
use average per capita personal i ncome in the metropolitan statistical area in which the team 
is located.    All price and income measures ( p and INC) are  adjusted for inflation.    The 
win/loss records of MLB teams, WPCT (winning percentage) and GB (number of games back 
behind the leader of a division), were obtained from Baseballstat.net.   
The  KPBL data c onsist of  a panel of  all eight teams covering the period from 1982 
through 2002.    KPBL attendance has been analyzed empirically by Lee (2004, 2006), but 
only in the  aggregate.  The panel data analysis here is the first attempt  of which we are 
aware to explain KPBL attendance empirically.  Unlike the FCI available for Major League 
Baseball, we know of no comparable measure of fan cost in Korea, so we use average ticket 
price.  Again, the income and price variables we use are adjusted for inflation. 
In the regression equation (3),  we allow for a vector of control regressors, xt.    In the 
MLB analysis, these include WPCT, GB and a “new stadium” variable, NEWST.  A positive 
relationship between attendance and a new stadium has been unambiguously documented in  
the literature, and  NEWST is designed to capture the effects of newly built or renovated 
stadiums on attendance.  Capturing the aging effect we use a four-year reverse trend as 
employed by Ahn and Lee (2003) and Poitras and Hadley (2006); NEWST is equal to 4 in the 
first year of a new or renovated stadium, 3 in the second year, 2 in the third year, and 1 in the 
fourth year.   
In the KPBL analysis, the control regressors include  WPCT, a  playoff dummy ( PO), 
stadium size (STDM) and MLB effects (PARK).  We use PO as a team performance variable 
in place of GB (used for MLB).  Since the KPBL has only one league and one division, GB 
provides essentially the same information as WPCT.  M oreover, GB in the KPBL does not 
represent playoff uncertainty as it does in MLB.  In MLB stadiums, there is little variation in 
capacity (most are equipped with more than forty thousand seats), but significant variation in 
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quality, so we use a new stadium variable to capture this quality effect.  On the other hand, 
there are substantial  variations in the capacities of KPBL stadiums; the largest stadium has 
more than thirty thousand seats while the smallest stadium has only 8,200.    Therefore, we 
include STDM to capture stadium effects in the KPBL.    In his analysis of KPBL attendance, 
Lee (2006) argues that “the MLB effect” is a major source of the dramatic attendance decline 
in the late 1990s.  The MLB effect is a function of the performance of native Korean players 
who have moved on to MLB teams.  Since 1993, a steady stream of amateur players with 
star potential, as well as superstars already playing in the KPBL, has left the KPBL to join 
either MLB teams or the Japanese Professional Baseball League.  The success of Korean 
players in MLB, such as Chan Ho Park, drew the attention of many KPBL fans to MLB 
games, with the result that Korean broadcasters have begun to air MLB games nationally.  
Though initial attention was focused primarily on  the performance of Korean-born MLB 
players, eventually these broadcasts seem to have drawn fans (who now paid greater attention 
to MLB games, even when they lacked Korean players) away from the KPBL.  Lee (2006) 
used PARK (innings Park pitched in a season) to capture the MLB effects, since  Korean 
national TV broadcast only those MLB games in which Park started until the end of the 2002 
season,  for the simple reason that he was a regularly scheduled starter and predictable 
programming element.   Following Lee (2006), we also include PARK as a control variable.   
3.2. Empirical Results 
3.2.1.  Major League Baseball 
In our  regressions, we treat the price growth rate (Dln(pt+1)) and  the utility-shifting 
variables in  xt+1 as weakly exogenous with respect to the forecasting error  et+1: that is, 
E[Dln(pt+1)et+1] = 0 and E(xt+1'et+1) = 0.  In so doing, we are assuming that the MLB fans 
have full information about prices one period in the future.    We estimate equation (3) with 
and without individual team dummy variables.  We assume the fixed effects model since our 8 
sample covers most of the MLB teams and all of the KPBL teams.    As discussed in section 2 
above, OLS estimates are inconsistent if the attendance data  include measurement errors.  
The Generalized Method of Moments (GMM; see Hansen, 1982) estimation results reported 
in Table 3 validate this concern.   T he t wo-step GMM  controls for autocorrelations in the 
errors by the Newey-West method (1987), setting the bandwidth parameter at two.    In order 
to control for time-specific fixed effects, we  include time dummy variables in our MLB 
specifications (see Ahn and Lee, 2003 for more details).   
Panel I in Table 2  reports the results from the regressions with both time effects and 
individual effects, while Panel I I reports the results with time effects only.   In the columns 
labeled  “GMM (i)” and “GMM (ii)” we present the GMM estimates obtained from the 
regression without and with  D ln(INCt+1) as a regressor respectively.    The lagged incomes 
in differenced log form and two-period log-level income (D ln(INCt) and ln(INCt-1)) are 
legitimate instruments because they should not be correlated with future forecasting errors 
under the rational expectations assumption.  Since income variables do not appear in the 
Euler condition (2) for the life-time utility maximization, equation (3) should not depend on 
income variables if it is a good approximation.   
First, we test the null hypothesis of the equality of individual (team) effects.    The 
2 c  
test statistic is 26.34 and it is not rejected (p=0.39).  Moreover, the GMM estimation and test 
results remain almost identical whether or not individual effects are included.    Thus, we will 
henceforth focus on the results obtained from the regressions with time effects only.   
The OLS results support the notion that MLB attendance is habit-forming, and the small 
and statistically insignificant estimate of the coefficient on price implies a small intertemporal 
substitution effect.   But the OLS estimates are inconsistent if the attendance data contain 
measurement errors.  The GMM estimation results are reported in the next column of Table 
2,  along with some hypothesis tests.   The 
2 c   tests for exogeneity soundly reject the 
hypothesis that the lagged attendance growth rate is exogenous with respect to model error 9 
terms.   The Hansen tests (overidentifying restrictions tests) do not reject the legitimacy of 
our instruments and model specification.  These results support the use of GMM instead of 
OLS.  We also test  for the  exogeneity of the income growth rate and the result does not 
support that the variable is potentially correlated with model error terms.    These results 
provide indirect evidence that the linearized condition ( 3) is a good approximation of the 
Euler condition (2). 
Compared to the OLS results, our GMM estimation results reveal strong evidence that 
MLB  attendance is habit-forming.  The GMM estimate of the coefficient on  Dln(ATTt) is 
0.631 and its standard error is 0.107 (Column GMM (ii) of Panel II).   This estimated habit 
effect is much bigger than the OLS estimate of 0.115.  The estimated coefficient on price is 
negative but statistically insignificant, consistent with a  low IES for MLB attendance.  The 
GMM estimates of team performance and stadium quality effects are generally  similar to 
those from OLS.  GMM generates statistically significant estimates of the win percent effect 
as well as the new or renovated stadium effect.   
It is well known that (linear) GMM and instrumental variables estimators could be 
substantially biased if the endogenous regressors and  their  instruments are only weakly 
correlated (See Staiger and Stock, 1997).  Table 3 shows the regression results of the lagged 
attendance growth rate (Dln(ATTt)) on the instruments and the other regressors in  equation 
(3)  to  check  the quality of our instruments.    Lagged attendance growth rate is highly 
correlated with the instruments and other regressors, indicating that our GMM  analyses are 
unlikely to suffer from weak instruments.   
Our estimation results for Major League Baseball can be summarized as follows:  First, 
we find strong evidence (in the form of positive and statistically significant coefficients on 
D ln(ATTt), which represent our estimates of  a  in equation (3)) for the “addictive” nature of 
MLB attendance.    Second, the estimated intertemporal elasticity of substitution (i.e., the 
coefficients on  Dln(pt+1)) is small and (mostly) statistically insignificant.  These two results 10 
are precisely the conditions identified by Ahn and Lee (2003) as conducive to the pricing of 
tickets in the inelastic range of demand.  T hese results also validate and extend the findings 
of Ahn and Lee (2003).  That is, we obtain the empirical results of strong habit formation 
and small IES for MLB  attendance demand even when we  substitute a measure of total 
attendance costs (FCI) for ticket price.    This is strong evidence that the trading off of  gate 
revenues for additional concessionary revenue cannot by itself  explain the observed inelastic 
pricing behavior of MLB teams.    Third, winning percentage is an important factor  that 
influences fans’ attendance decisions, but we do not find strong games-back (GB) effects.  
Last, new stadiums are found to have positive effects on attendance.   
3.2.2.  Korean Professional Baseball League 
Table 4 reports estimation results for the KPBL data.    Panel I reports the results from the 
regressions with individual effects, while Panel II reports the results without team effects.   
We  cannot include time dummies in the KPBL estimation, given our inclusion of the team-
invariant variable  PARK, which represents the MLB effect on the KPBL attendance.   
However, unlike the MLB experience during this time period (which included several work-
stoppages), KPBL did not have any particular temporally specific events.    As we found in 
the  MLB case, the null hypothesis of the equality of individual (team) effects in the KPBL  is 
not rejected, so we will focus on the results obtained from the regressions without team fixed 
effects.    The price  coefficient i s statistically significant at 1 % and its absolute value is 
greater than one.  Again, the OLS estimates are inconsistent if the attendance data contain 
measurement errors.   
According to the GMM estimation results in Table 4 , the 
2 c   tests  strongly reject the 
hypothesis that the lagged attendance growth rate is exogenous with respect to model error 
terms.   The Hansen tests do not reject the legitimacy of our instruments and model 11 
specification.   Moreover, our test of the exogeneity of the income growth rate is not rejected 
(p=0.383).     
Table 5 provides validation for our choice of  instruments:  the lagged attendance growth 
rate is highly correlated with the instruments and other regressors, and the coefficient on 
lagged income is not statistically significant.  These results indicate that our GMM estimates 
are unlikely to suffer from bias due to weak instruments. 
Contrary to our MLB findings,  GMM estimation  (and in particular, the small and 
statistically insignificant coefficient on  Dln(ATTt)) does not support the hypothesis t hat 
KPBL attendance is habit-forming: the GMM estimate of the coefficient is only 0.064 and it 
is insignificant  even  at 10% confidence (Column GMM (ii) of Panel II).    The estimated 
coefficient on price is negative, has magnitude greater than unity,  and  is  statistically 
significant even at 1% confidence.   T his also stands in contradiction to our MLB findings, 
and implies that the IES for KPBL games is located in elastic region.
3    The stadium size 
turns out to have a substantial effect on attendance.  This result is not surprising, given the 
large variation in stadium capacity in our sample: Table 6 shows the four cases in which 
KPBL teams moved or constructed their stadiums.  All four moves to larger stadiums drew 
more  attendance  than before movement even when (in two of the four cases) their team 
win/loss record worsened.    Our finding of statistically significant (negative) effects of MLB 
airtime on KPBL attendance is also consistent with Lee (2006), who finds that the dispersion 
of MLB games has negative effects on KPBL attendance.     
In comparing our MLB results (Table 2) with those for KPBL (Table 4), the differences 
are striking:  we find that MLB attendance is strongly habit-forming, whereas KPBL 
attendance is not; and that while MLB fan behavior exhibits a  small intertemporal elasticity 
                                                               
3 Unfortunately, our empirical model does not generate estimates of the static price elasticity.  We know of 
only one estimate of demand elasticity for the KPBL:  Lee (2006) reports a negative but statistically 
insignificant coefficient in the inelastic region of demand.   12 
of substitution, IES for the KPBL is large.  These differences appear to reflect differing 
pricing strategies on the part of profit-maximizing team owners, which are presumably driven 
by fundamental differences in fan behavior.
4    In the next section we offer a review of the 
literature on the psychology, anthropology, and endocrinology of the sports fan; and sketch a 
formal model of fan behavior consistent with these literatures before discussing differences in 
the cultural environments or other factors that might explain our divergent findings for the 
U.S. and Korea.   
4.  Natural Addiction to…Baseball? 
4.1. Endogenizing Addiction 
Theories of rational addiction  define a good as habit-forming  if it exhibits  adjacent 
complementarity—that is to say,  if the marginal utility of consumption increases with 
experience.  Although a number of authors have subsequently criticized the  original  theory 
of Becker and Murphy (1988) for lacking psychological realism
5, the origins of or reasons for 
intertemporal complementarities have received little attention.  This is unfortunate, because 
a deeper understanding of the reasons for such complementarities is prerequisite to any 
attempt to make  ex ante predictions about which goods or services in the economy are likely 
to be habit forming.  Our approach, therefore, will be to take a step back and look more 
broadly at what the scientific literature has to say about the human phenomenon of spectator 
sports.  In this enterprise we draw inspiration from the work of Smith and Tasnadi (2003), 
                                                               
4  To be sure, there are other possible explanations for these differences—the Korean league is characterized by 
corporate ownership, for instance, and the corporate name is strongly associated with that of the team (e.g., the 
“Samsung Lions”; the “Hyundai Unicorns”); there is also the possibility of systematic differences in 
measurement error across countries.  But it is not clear that such differences would generate the important 
differences in the dynamic structure of prices suggested by our results.   
5  See, for example, Bernheim and Rangel (2002), Gruber and Köszegi (2001), Gul and Pesendorfer (2001), 
Laibson (2001), O’Donoghue and Rabin, (2002), Orphanides and Zervos (1995), and Orphanides and Zervos 
(1998).   13 
who study the problem of habit formation in dietary preferences.  In addition to showing 
that the process of Bayesian learning can generate adjacent complementarity in an optimal 
foraging framework, the authors provide a review and synthesis of the biomedical literature 
as it relates to the neuroscience of dietary habits and drugs of addiction.  As it turns out, 
these two subjects are intimately related: considerable evidence points to a role for the class 
of neurotransmitters known as the endogenous opioids in the learning of dietary preferences, 
and the endogenous opioids work in part by acting on dopaminergic neurons in  the limbic 
region of the brain.  These dopaminergic neurons have been identified, in turn, as both the 
physical locus of associative learning and a target of virtually every known drug of addiction 
(Yeomans and Gray 2002, Di Chiara 1999).   
The take-home lessons from Smith and Tasnádi (2003), which will be taken to heart in 
the present study, are that i)  habit  formation has something to do with learning, or the 
evolutionary vestiges of learning, and ii) one method of verifying naturalistic explanations for 
habit formation (and thus pointing the way to a theory of endogenous habit formation)  is to 
identify the natural function of the neuroendocrine systems underlying the behavior in 
question.  In particular, once the natural function (e.g., the inference of nutritional properties 
of foods from environmental cues) of a neuroendocrine system (e.g., the endogenous opioids) 
has been identified, it can be interpreted as a physiological indicator of an internal 
information state, where information is taken to be subjective.
6   
                                                               
6 Subjectivity here is used in the sense of Savage (1954).  That is, the information state or “beliefs” of the 
consumer in an uncertain world can be inferred from his behavior, even if the consumer professes an inability to 
explicitly characterize properties of the probability distributions involved.  Because the simultaneous 
identification of utilities and subjective probabilities can be impracticable, and because subjective probabilities 
may diverge from objective measures of probability (particularly when the behavior in question is a vestige of 
human evolutionary history), it can be informative to resort to physiological or biochemical measures of 
information states.  See Smith and Tasnádi (2003). 14 
4.2.   Whence the Sports Fan? 
The first step in proposing a naturalistic theory of the sports fan is to identify the likely 
analogue of modern sports competition in human evolutionary history.  From the 
perspective of the anthropologist, team sports are a modern example of intergroup aggression 
in which athletic prowess plays a prominent role in success.   Idyllic  neolithic fantasies 
notwithstanding, intergroup aggression (war) was in fact quite common in pre-industrial 
societies, as evidenced by both a growing body of archaeological data and an increasing 
number of empirical  studies  of extant hunter-gatherer groups ( Ember 1978, Keely 1996).  
Intergroup aggression is thought to have resulted in the evolution of the “in-group” 
psychology—our tendency to classify our conspecifics as “friend” or “foe”—that generates, 
for example, a propensity toward racism in modern humans (Campbell 1965, Sidanius and 
Pratto 1999).  In-group psychology need not be based on race, however:  Kurzban  et al. 
(2001), for instance,  showed that when laboratory subjects were exposed to a conflict 
between two f ictional basketball teams, race-based errors in identity recall declined 
dramatically when players were shown wearing team colors.  Dedication to one’s group in 
evolutionary history is thought to have been  adaptive because it facilitated mutual aid, via 
both reciprocal exchange of foodstuffs (and other assets) among group members and an 
implied promise of defense against predation or aggression by out-groups (Wrangham 1986, 
Harcourt and De Waal 1992).   
Theorizing about the evolutionary origins of modern human behavior always carries with 
it the danger of generating “just so” stories, making it incumbent on the purveyor of such 
theories to cast a wide net when identifying supporting (or contradictory) evidence.  One 
body of such evidence that is becoming increasingly available to the behavioral scientist is 
derived from studies of endocrinology.
7  Endocrine hormones are easily measured in saliva 
                                                               
7  Endocrinology is the study of the body’s molecular signals (e.g., hormones, neurotransmitters) and their 
influence on health, physiology, and behavior.   15 
or blood plasma and typically induce a number of (often disparate) effects on physiology and 
behavior that suggest their function in evolutionary history.  The most-studied endocrine 
signal in the realm of human competition is testosterone.  It has been shown, for example, 
that testosterone levels go up in winners and down in losers, in competitive situations ranging 
from wrestling to soccer to crew to tennis to chess (Bernstein et al. 1974, Booth et al. 1989, 
Mazur et al. 1992, Neave and Wolfson 2003, Kivlighan et al. 2005).
8   
Before delving into the question of what testosterone tells us about competitive behavior, 
it is worth asking what it has to do with sports fans.  As it turns out, sports fans respond to 
wins and losses much the same as the athletes themselves:  avid fans watching a basketball 
game, for instance, exhibit higher self-esteem (as measured by subsequent self-evaluation of 
performance on an unrelated task) after a win than after a loss (Hirt  et al. 1992), and the 
testosterone levels of basketball and soccer fans have been shown to increase after a win and 
decrease after a loss (Bernhardt et al. 1998).  Indeed, even imagined success at competitive 
tasks can have a demonstrable effect on testosterone levels (Schultheiss  et al. 1999).  It 
might seem illogical for a spectator watching a competition—the outcome of which he cannot 
control, involving players he is unlikely ever to meet—to react with very real physiological 
adaptation and personal  attribution.  But this sort of irrationality  is in fact  a hallmark of 
evolved behaviors: because humans evolved in a world without television and anonymous or 
one-time interactions, we behave as if the characters in soap operas (who, it is worth noting, 
are not shy about revealing intimate personal details) were intimate friends, just as we behave 
as if the pitcher in the World Series can hear us when we shout at his image on the screen 
(O’Guinn and Shrum 1997, Eastman and Riggs 1994).   
                                                               
8 In spite of the popular conception of testosterone as an exclusively male “sex hormone,” testosterone levels in 
women (though much lower, on average, than those observed in men) are also affected by athletic competition 
(Edwards and Wetzel 2002, Edwards and Waters 2003,).  Unfortunately, there are far fewer studies of 
testosterone in women, and most focus on gender-specific differences in testosterone response.  For details see 
Cashdan (1995), Bateup et al. (2002), Wyner and Edwards (2002), and Kivlighan et al. (2005).   16 
A common misconception holds that high-testosterone males are aggressive.  A more 
nuanced view is that those with high testosterone are less apt to back down from a challenge.  
In some populations (e.g., prison inmates) where challenges are common, positive 
correlations between aggression and testosterone have been observed (Dabbs et al. 1995), but 
high-testosterone men in general  are no more likely than other men to wind up in prison, and 
can be found in professions  ranging from actor to trial lawyer to politician (Dabbs 1992).  
And more importantly, the response of testosterone levels to competition  appears to be a 
function of perceived causation: increases in testosterone after a win, for instance, are greater 
when  the victor v iews his performance positively and attributes the outcome to personal 
effort ( Booth et al. 1989, Serrano et al. 2000, Gonzalez-Bono et al. 2000).  This evidence, 
taken together, seems to suggest that testosterone is in some sense a n (unconscious) internal 
barometer of one’s likelihood of success in future conflicts.  This hypothesis is supported by 
the fact that testosterone appears to simultaneously prepare us for such conflicts, not just by 
stimulating the growth of skeletal  muscles  but also by increasing our self-confidence and 
ability to focus on the task at hand (Knickmeyer et al. 2005).   
So we have the beginnings of a naturalistic theory of the sports fan: humans have a 
universal tendency to form and join coalitions or groups; this tendency is a product of our 
natural history of intergroup conflict; and fans appear (if subconsciously) to  react to 
competitive outcomes much as athletes do, as  evidenced by the many  parallels in 
psychological and neuroendocrine (testosterone) measures.  It remains to be established that 
the state of being a sports fan is (or might be expected to be) habit forming, in the sense that 
the marginal utility of fandom increases over time.  This is the subject of the next section.   
4.3.   Fandom as a Signaling Game 
There a re many reasons to expect spectator sports to be habit-forming: the longer one 
follows a team, the more he/she learns about the strategy of the game, the particular talents 17 
and personalities of the players, and the culture and nature of other sports fans.    In the 
naturalistic counterpart of spectator sports, these accumulated bits of information would all 
have served an adaptive purpose, enabling the “fan” to better predict competitive outcomes 
and make judgments about when (and how) to offer assistance to fellow  group members.  
But perhaps more importantly, participation as a fan would serve the purpose of cementing 
one’s reputation as a loyal member of the group, worthy of trust and mutual aid.  To see 
how concerns about reputation might lead to habit formation, consider the following decision 
problem: 
An individual (i.e., a fan) is periodically presented with opportunities to participate in 
(“attend”) a group activity.  Other members of the group have incomplete information about 
the true degree of the fan’s allegiance: a steadfast fan (“member”) will attend any given event 
with probability  M p , while a lesser fan (“non-member”) will attend with probability  N p , 
where  M N p p < .  In period t, the probability of the fan being a member  (given prior beliefs 
1 - t p  and current attendance attt) is denoted  t p .  The fan receives periodic income m, which 
can be spent on attendance at price p or  on a composite numeraire good ct.  Fan utility in 
period t is a linear function
9 of  t p  and ct, yielding the optimization problem 
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and the resulting (myopic) decision rule is “attend if and only if  ( ) 1 - £ t f p p ,” where 
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-  is the marginal 
                                                               
9  Linear utility is employed here in order to better focus attention on the nonlinearities introduced by Bayesian 
learning about reputation.  There is no  a priori reason to expect linearity, but to our knowledge the 
anthropological evidence on the mapping of reputation and group membership into Darwinian fitness is not yet 
sufficient to suggest an alternative functional form.   18 
increase (i.e., the increase attributable to period t attendance) in the fan’s posterior probability 
of being a member.  This decision rule is myopic in the sense that it excludes long-term 
dynamic considerations, but it underscores the importance of the function  ( ) 1 - t f p , which is 
concave and (for low values of  1 - t p ) increasing in  1 - t p .  In other words, concerns about 
reputation generate marginal utilities that are increasing in attendance for new fans.  This is, 
of course, the central behavioral postulate in the theory of rational addiction.   
For our purposes, the value in considering the natural origins of fan behavior stems from 
the rich descriptive theory that results.  Modeling fan behavior as a  signaling problem is  
consistent not only with the evidence from anthropology and behavioral endocrinology 
reviewed above, but it also fits well with many of the idiosyncratic aspects of fan behavior, 
such as the tendency of fans to congregate in social settings (i.e., stadiums, bars, or living 
rooms) when viewing games, and to make their allegiances known via both verbal 
proclamation and the prominent display of team apparel.  The importance of habit formation 
among fans is implicitly acknowledged by team owners not only in their pricing strategies (as 
suggested by the evidence presented in Section 3 above) but also in such widely used 
promotional strategies as product giveaways and group or organizational discounts.  And if 
habit formation  among fans  is in part a function of reputational considerations, and we can 
identify the determinants of reputation (or their psychological analogues in the modern 
world), we can make predictions about the circumstances most conducive to habit formation.  
The next section considers some of the differences between the baseball cultures of the U.S. 
and Korea, how they might explain the divergent findings reported in Section 3 above, and 
how they may point the way to an endogenous theory of baseball addiction.   
4.4.   Baseball Culture in the U.S. and Korea 
As noted above, t here are many differences between Major League Baseball and its 
counterpart in Korea: size, ownership structure, and interaction between the leagues, to name 19 
a few.  It is possible that these differences—or perhaps differences in the nature of the data 
employed in our empirical analysis of Section 3—can account for the very different results 
we obtain.  But there are also important cultural and structural differences between the two 
leagues that—consistent with the evidence reviewed in Section 4—appear to act in concert to 
generate important differences in the fan environment that make habit formation less likely in 
the KPBL market.  These differences fall into three categories:  i) fan exposure to home-
team commentary, ii) opportunities for conspicuous devotion, and iii) prevalence of 
alternative out-group categorization(s).   
While most Major League Baseball teams in the U.S. enjoy a preponderance of local 
coverage, including radio and television broadcasts hosted by home-team commentators, this 
is decidedly not the case in the Korean professional league.  Due in part to the limited 
geographical area of Korea,  all television broadcasts reach the entire nation.  This means 
that  a baseball fan in Korea has more exposure to opposing teams, and generally does not 
watch games in the presence of biased commentary.  Both these features of the fan 
environment are less conducive to the triggering of the in-group psychology discussed in 
Section 4.2 above (Sidanius and Pratto 1999).  Even in the one outlet—local newspapers—
where home-biased coverage might be expected, coverage is much less frequent than in the 
U.S. (see Tables 7 and 8), where the local sports page typically features extensive coverage of 
the home team on a daily basis.   
There are also cultural differences between the two countries we study that influence the 
extent to which fans engage in conspicuous declarations of team loyalty.  In particular, we 
have noticed that in our experience, it is very common for fans of Major League Baseball to 
wear caps or other apparel displaying team colors and logos (even when not engaged in 
sports-related activity) and to gather in bars or other social settings when watching games.  
This stands in stark contrast to the behavior of Korean fans, who rarely engage in such overt 
displays of devotion, and do not typically gather in bars to drink beer while watching games 20 
on television.
10  In other words, there is much less opportunity for the Korean fan to engage 
in the signaling behavior that the model presented in Section 4.3 above suggests might be a 
key to the fan-team bonding underlying habit formation among baseball spectators.   
Last but not least, there is the important interaction between  the  KPBL and MLB in the 
Korean market.  As noted above, Korean fans are often drawn to coverage of Major League 
Baseball when well-known Korean players are involved.  A recent survey by Gallup Korea 
(2002), for example, found that while 36.1% of Korean fans reported watching KPBL games 
for at least one hour in the preceding month, fully 30.4% reported watching at least one hour 
of MLB games featuring Korean players.  This is significant because—as demonstrated, for 
instance, by Kurzban et al. (2001)—it provides an alternative definition of the in-group with 
which fans identify.  In other words, the Korean fan exposed to MLB is more likely to self-
identify as a fan of successful Korean MLB players, which in turn  could diminish self-
identification with local Korean teams.   
5.  Conclusion 
That habitual consumption is deeply engrained in human nature is beyond dispute.  The 
science of  the  empirical identification and measurement of such habituation, however, 
remains the subject of considerable debate.  In this essay, we offer a modest contribution to 
this literature, by documenting the dramatic differences in dynamic pricing strategies between 
two professional baseball leagues, and by proposing the beginnings of an explanation for 
these differences.   
                                                               
10 T here are instances in which large crowds of Korean fans gather in the streets to watch a game on a big 
screen, but only for special events such as national team competition in FIFA World Cup or World Baseball 
Classic games.     21 
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics for Sample Data 
 
Major League Baseball 
Variable  Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Maximum  Minimum 
ATT: attendance (millions)  2.196  0.731  4.483    0.906 
p: real Fan Cost Index  72.208     17.133    134.867     44.898 
INC: real income ($ thousands)  19.498     4.036    42.250     12.845 
WPCT: winning percentage  0.501     0.067     0.704     0.327 
GB: games back  13.643  11.166   52.000     0.000 
Korean Professional Baseball League   
Variable  Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Maximum  Minimum 
ATT: attendance (millions)  0.407  0.244  1.265    0.050 
p: real ticket price  63.391     7.271    91.376     48.940 
INC: real income (million Won)  6.069     2.022    12.535     2.195 
WPCT: winning percentage  0.500     0.096     0.706     0.188 
STDM: stadium size (ten thousands)  1.862  0.838   3.048     0.820 
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TABLE 2 
Major League Baseball: OLS and Two-Step GMM Estimation 
For the table below, all of the regressors except  D ln(ATTt) are assumed to be weakly exogenous. Both 
differenced and level instruments are used.   Standard errors are computed adjusting for  autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity.   
 
  Panel I  Panel II 
Time and Team Effects  Time Effects Only 
Variables 
OLS  GMM (i)  GMM(ii)  OLS  GMM (i)  GMM (ii) 

















































































Dln(INCt+1)      -0.615 
(1.329) 
    0.973 
(0.687) 










2  0.648  0.514  0.519  0.599  0.475  0.487 
Hansen Test











  15.817 
[0.000] 






  1.599 
[0.206] 





$   
  26.335 
[0.390] 
       
* Significant at 1% level. 
** Significant at 5% level. 
*** Significant at 10% level. 
$ 
2 c   test. 
The numbers in (.) are standard errors. 
The numbers in [.] are p-values. 27 
TABLE 3 
Major League Baseball:   
Testing the Quality of the Instruments 
For the table below, the endogenous regressor  Dln(ATTt) is regressed on other exogenous regressors and 
instrumental variables. All of the regressors except  D ln(ATTt) are assumed to be exogenous. Both differenced 
and level instruments are used.    Standard errors are computed adjusting  for  autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity. 
 
  Panel I  Panel II 
Variables  Time and Team Effects  Time Effects Only 
D ln(pt+1)          0.275
*** (0.160)          0.471
*     (0.149) 
D WPCTt+1           0.079   (0.283)         -0.079    (0.264) 
DGBt+1         -0.001   (0.002)         -0.002    (0.002) 
DNEWSTt+1         -0.006   (0.016)         -0.006    (0.018) 
D ln(pt)         -0.279
**  (0.142)          0.040    (0.134) 
D WPCTt          1.518
*    (0.374)
          1.164
*     (0.353)
 
DGBt         -0.001   (0.002)         -0.002    (0.002) 
D NEWSTt          0.032
*** (0.019)
          0.032
     (0.020)
 
D ln(INCt)          0.065   (0.493)          0.068    (0.459) 
ln(pt-1)         -0.511
*    (0.144)
         -0.168
***  (0.089)
 
WPCTt-1          1.035
**  (0.458)          0.438    (0.326) 
GBt-1         -0.001   (0.003)         -0.002    (0.002) 
NEWSTt-1         -0.010
    (0.013)
         -0.010
     (0.014)
 
ln(INCt-1)         -0.094   (0.377)             0.011    (0.078)
 
Constant             0.308    (0.726) 
R
2          0.723          0.683 
F-test for overall significance          702.48   [0.000]           725.19    [0.000] 
* Significant at 1% level. 
** Significant at 5% level. 
*** Significant at 10% level. 
The numbers in (.) are standard errors. 
The numbers in [.] are p-values. 
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TABLE 4 
Korean Professional Baseball League:   
OLS and Two-Step GMM Estimation 
For the table below, all of the regressors except  Dln(ATTt) are assumed to be weakly exogenous.  Both 
differenced and level instruments are used.   Standard errors are computed adjusting for autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity. 
 
  Panel I  Panel II 
With Team Effects  Without Team Effects 
Variables 
OLS  GMM (i)  GMM(ii)  OLS  GMM (i)  GMM (ii) 






































































































D ln(INCt+1)      -1.071
*** 
(0.568) 
    - 0.543 
(0.620) 









2  0.383  0.268  0.279  0.364  0.271  0.277 
Hansen Test











  3.290 
[0.070] 






  0.380 
[0.538] 





$   
  10.375 
[0.168] 
       
* Significant at 1% level. 
** Significant at 5% level. 
*** Significant at 10% level. 
$ 
2 c   test. 
The numbers in (.) are standard errors. 
The numbers in [.] are p-values. 29 
TABLE 5 
Korean Professional Baseball League:   
Testing the Quality of the Instruments 
For the table below, the endogenous regressor  Dln(ATTt) is regressed on other exogenous regressors and 
instrumental variables.    All of the regressors except  D ln(ATTt) are assumed to be  exogenous. Both 
differenced and level instruments are used.   Standard errors are computed adjusting for  autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity. 
 
  Panel I  Panel II 
Variables  With Team Effects  Without Team Effects 
D ln(pt+1)          0.821   (0.510)          0.869
***   (0.455) 
D WPCTt+1           0.618   (0.395)           0.622    (0.406) 
DPOt+1           0.007   (0.071)           0.025    (0.069) 
D STDMt+1           0.434   (0.329)           0.408    (0.307) 
D PARKt+1           0.001   (0.011)           0.001     (0.009) 
Dln(pt)         - 1.539
*  (0.442)         - 1.453
*   (0.360) 
D WPCTt          1.664
**   (0.649)
          1.664
**    (0.686)
 
D POt           0.078   (0.116)           0.111    (0.118) 
D STDMt          0.179   (0.254)
          0.133
    (0.207)
 
DPARKt         - 0.028
*  (0.006)         -0.029
*   (0.006) 
D ln(INCt)         -0.148   (0.734)         -0.200    (0.740) 
ln(pt-1)         -0.440
**   (0.475)
         -0.277
**    (0.319)
 
WPCTt-1         - 0.015   (0.693)          0.026    (0.696) 
POt-1         -0.022   (0.128)           0.021    (0.136) 
STDMt-1           0.145   (0.183)
           0.086
      (0.059)
 
PARKt-1         -0.007   (0.004)         -0.007
**   (0.003) 
ln(INCt-1)           0.084   (0.156)             0.093    (0.104)
 
Constant                     1 .020    ( 1.315) 
R
2          0.415          0.406 
F-test for overall significance          133.42  [0.000]           116.06   [0.000] 
* Significant at 1% level. 
** Significant at 5% level. 
*** Significant at 10% level. 
The numbers in (.) are standard errors. 
The numbers in [.] are p-values. 
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TABLE 6 
Stadium Movement and Attendance Change in the   
Korean Professional Baseball League 
 
Team  Season  Stadium  Capacity  Win Percent  Attendance 
1984  Dongdaemoon  22,706  0.59  137,785 
Doosan Bears 
1985  Jamsil  30,265  0.47  252,731 
1984  Gooduck  10,000  0.54  377,971 
Lotte Giants 
1985  Sajik  30,154  0.49  523,082 
1989  Dongdaemoon  22,706  0.42  427,678 
LG Twins 
1990  Jamsil  30,265  0.59  768,329 
2001  Incheon  11,465  0.46  178,645 
SK Wyberns 
2002  Moonhak  30,480  0.47  402,732 
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TABLE 7 
Local Korean Newspaper Coverage: 
Frequency of Top Story in Local Sports Section, April 2005 
 
Team  Host City  Local 
Baseball 
Local Football  MLB & JPBL  Others 
Hyundai Unicorns  Suwon  1  9  0  14 
SK Wyverns  Incheon  7  4  0  15 
Hanwha Eagles  Daejun  8  4  2  11 
Kia Tigers  Kwangju  7  1  1  14 
Samsung Lions  Daegu  18  5  1  1 
Lotte Giants  Pusan  3  0  3  17 
MLB covers Korean major leaguers news 
JPBL covers Korean JPBL(Japanese Professional Baseball League) player news. 
 
TABLE 8 
Seoul Newspaper Coverage: 
Frequency of Top Story in Sports Dailies, April 2005 
 
Teams in Seoul  Sports 
Newspaper 
Baseball  Football  MLB & 
JPBL 
Others 
Sports Seoul  9(5)  4  7  6 
Sports Today  14(7)  2  5  5 
LG Twins 
Doosan Bears 
Sports Daily  17 (7)  2  5  2 
Numbers in (.) are frequency of local (Seoul) baseball teams. 
MLB covers Korean major leaguers news 
JPBL covers Korean JPBL(Japanese Professional Baseball League) player news 
 